TEHRAN - More than a month into the US-Israeli war against Iran, early expectations of a swift military victory have faded, exposing what analysts describe as a series of miscalculations about Iran’s likely response. 

What was initially framed as a short and decisive campaign has evolved into a prolonged conflict marked by continued exchanges of fire, damage to infrastructure and rising regional tensions.

At the outset, US and Israeli planners appeared to assume that the assassination of Iran’s Leader would trigger internal fragmentation and weaken the political system. 

Another assumption was that Iran’s military resistance would be limited in duration. Despite reported losses and sustained pressure, Iran has continued to mount military responses, indicating both operational capacity and a willingness to sustain a longer conflict. There has been no clear indication of an imminent surrender.

Expectations of domestic unrest have also not materialized. Rather than sparking protests, the conflict has, by most accounts, contributed to a degree of internal unity, with public sentiment shaped by the perception of external threat. 

On the battlefield, assumptions about air superiority have also been tested. While US and Israeli forces maintain advanced aerial capabilities, Iran’s air defense systems have complicated efforts to establish full control over its airspace, according to military analysts.

Other projections have similarly come under strain. Early expectations that the Strait of Hormuz would remain unaffected, or that broader economic consequences could be contained, have been challenged by market volatility and heightened concerns over energy security. 

Taken together, these developments point to a widening gap between initial expectations and the evolving realities on the ground. Analysts say the conflict now reflects a more complex and uncertain trajectory, with no clear path to a near-term resolution.

The following is a closer look at ten factors contributing to this miscalculation:

1. Leader's assassination leads to system collapse 

The proposition that assassinating Iran's Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameni, would trigger systemic collapse represents less a strategic hypothesis than a category error. Western planners persist in projecting their own institutional fragilities onto structures they have not troubled themselves to comprehend.

Israel and the United States remain locked inside a repertoire of violence—assassination, attrition, invasion—that betrays not strength but imaginative exhaustion. Trump's inadvertent admission that America bombs Iran "out of habit" diagnosed the pathology: reflex masquerading as doctrine.

The so-called “decapitation” logic assumes leadership elimination produces organisational paralysis. This holds where power concentrates in irreplaceable individuals. Iran's system distributes authority across the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, military units, and clerical hierarchies embedded in provincial governance. The Leader arbitrates this ecosystem; he does not constitute it. The Assembly exists precisely to manage succession without existential rupture. Eighty-eight jurists represent not ceremony but institutional buffer capacity.

Western strategic thinking conflates political death with government failure because its own systems operate through personality-dependent hierarchies. Iran's architecture fuses theological legitimation with committee governance—a structure engineered to absorb shocks that would fracture personalised autocracies. Succession protocols refined over four decades do not evaporate when activated.

Crucially, assassination within value-rational frameworks does not merely remove individuals. It generates martyrdom capital the system metabolises into cohesion. Every assassination in Beirut, Gaza, and Tehran has validated this: military aggression cannot substitute for understanding the opponent's actual mechanics of resilience.

The decapitation playbook presumes all actors share Western cost-benefit calculations around self-preservation. It fails when confronting structures where sacrifice carries strategic weight, where institutions transcend individuals, where the very act of elimination becomes systemic fuel. Repeating the same violence while expecting different results is not strategy. It is ritual.

2. Iran to surrender after brief resistance 

The prediction that sufficient military pressure would produce swift Iranian capitulation has now been tested across six weeks of sustained conflict. Tehran absorbed strikes, maintained command continuity, and preserved state cohesion without offering the political surrender Western strategists projected as inevitable. This outcome reflects deliberate institutional design, not circumstantial resilience.

Iran's state apparatus was engineered to endure precisely the coercion now applied against it. Distributed missile infrastructure, redundant command nodes, ideological mechanisms that convert external threat into legitimacy—these represent four decades of adaptation to sanctions, sabotage, and assassination campaigns. The system optimised for survival under pressure rather than performance under normalcy.

The conflict's political dimension has followed trajectories Western models failed to anticipate. External coercion rarely produces the internal realignments attackers project onto target populations. Historical precedent across the region—from Lebanon to Iraq—suggests bombing campaigns consolidate rather than fracture state authority, particularly when the target state possesses functional governance structures and mobilisation capacity. Tehran demonstrated both throughout the escalation.

Six weeks in, the conflict has settled into precisely the protracted grind Iran's structure was built to sustain. The United States and Israel retain kinetic dominance without achieving political objectives. Tehran maintains asymmetric leverage—geographic chokepoints, alliances, escalation thresholds adversaries cannot fully control—without securing relief from pressure.

Systems constructed to survive coercion do not surrender on schedule. Strategic planning that ignores an opponent's actual institutional mechanics produces expensive stalemates, not clean victories. Six weeks have demonstrated which assumption proved correct.

3.  Public uprising to overthrow "regime"

The assumption that military strikes would catalyse popular insurrection against Iran’s government has not been borne out. Bombardment did not translate into domestic uprising aligned with external strategic objectives. Instead, it coincided with a consolidation that cuts across political differences and reflects something more structural.

Opposition to specific policies and endorsement of foreign attacks on national infrastructure are distinct political positions. These positions have not collapsed into one another. The distinction between internal political disagreement and external campaigns directed at state capacity has remained operative. The expectation that Israeli strikes could reorganise Iran’s political landscape rests on a misreading of how these boundaries function.

External coercion does not produce political change in a direct or predictable way. The destruction of infrastructure alters the conditions under which political life is conducted, but does not generate alignment with those producing that destruction. Political autonomy does not emerge from external force; it depends on the continuity of territorial and institutional frameworks that such campaigns place under strain.

Western strategic reasoning has often treated state vulnerability as an indicator of political availability. This assumption has limited empirical support. In contexts where infrastructure has been systematically targeted, populations have tended to attribute disruption externally rather than reassign responsibility inward.

Public mobilisation has taken place during the current conflict, but not in the direction the West anticipated. Demonstrations have not coalesced around demands for toppling the government, but around rejection of external intervention as a determining force in Iran’s political future.

The expectation that bombardment would produce internally aligned political outcomes has not materialised. The response has instead followed a different trajectory, shaped by the distinction between external coercion and the conditions under which political life is sustained.

4. Iran's airspace quickly secured

The ongoing war in West Asia has begun to unsettle long-held assumptions among military analysts about the durability of U.S. technological and aerial dominance, prompting a gradual re-evaluation rather than a sudden reversal. For decades, U.S. fighter jets were described in near-abstract terms—platforms of stealth, speed, and precision capable of bypassing both geography and political constraint. At the outset of the U.S.-Israeli strikes, and in the immediate shock following the martyrdom of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, that framework appeared momentarily reinforced. Yet as the conflict has unfolded, the operational environment has become less legible through that lens.

Across the wider campaign, U.S. aerial systems—both manned platforms and unmanned drones—have experienced sustained attrition across multiple operational zones. Taken individually, these incidents do not alter aggregate capability. Taken together, they complicate the assumption that Iranian airspace can be traversed without persistent operational cost.

Iran’s air defence posture is not organised around a single system but an assembled architecture of denial. Layered short-range interceptors, passive infrared tracking, and distributed sensing nodes produce a field in which certainty is progressively reduced rather than structurally guaranteed. The objective is less interception as an event than the sustained compression of operational predictability.

Within this configuration, even intermittent engagements carry cumulative weight. They alter flight profiles, extend stand-off distances, and increase reliance on electronic warfare and suppression cycles. The effect is not episodic but accretive, reshaping the grammar of aerial movement over time.

What emerges is not a simple contest over air dominance, but a redefinition of the conditions under which it can be exercised. The Iranian theatre no longer accommodates the assumptions that once underpinned Western air planning. Movement remains possible, but it is no longer separable from constraint.

5. No sign of a limited military response

Iran’s military response has diverged from early expectations that it would remain limited and defective, according to military analysts. 

A defining feature of Tehran’s multi-layered posture has been the continued use of missiles and drones for more than a month, hitting targets across Israel as well as US bases, assets and projects in host countries across the region.

Despite the deployment of multiple advanced air defense systems, analysts say not all incoming projectiles have been intercepted, allowing considerable numbers to penetrate and reach their targets. 

Iran has also shown a willingness to carry out retaliatory strikes against adversary interests in the region, in line with what officials describe as a policy of reciprocal response. Observers say this approach has contributed to deterrence by increasing the potential cost of escalation and introducing caution among opponents, particularly regarding possible strikes on Iranian infrastructure.

At the same time, Iran has maintained elements of its defensive and offensive capabilities despite sustained airstrikes. This comes even as it has suffered significant losses, including the assassinations of senior commanders, damage to missile facilities and the destruction of launch platforms. These developments have unfolded in a context where the United States and Israel are widely seen as holding air superiority over the Iranian soil.

Also, the overall morale among Iranian fighters has been described as steady, with officials signaling that additional capabilities may still be brought into play.

Regarding the maritime posture, Iran has sought to sustain its influence at sea, despite losses to its naval assets, relying on asymmetric tactics and detailed knowledge on the geography of the region. 

In a further development, Iran has claimed the ability to down advanced US aircraft, including stealth platforms, a claim that analysts say, if verified, would mark a notable shift in the conflict’s dynamics.

It is crucial to note that, despite setbacks and the extensive damage caused, the operational tempo of Iran's forces has shown no significant signs of slowing in its war against these powerful military adversaries.

6. Strategic mastery over the Strait 

One of the most significant miscalculations made by Washington and Tel Aviv was their underestimation of Tehran’s ability to maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz. Initially, both believed that they could swiftly defeat Iran militarily, with the expectation that Iran would be unable to defend or block the strategic waterway that facilitates a substantial portion of the world’s energy shipments.

This achievement has exerted significant economic pressure on global energy markets and, in turn, increased the costs of the war for the US and its allies.

One of the key factors behind this success lies in Iran’s years of preparation for such a scenario. The Iranian military, with its deep understanding of the region’s geography, has made the best use of domestically-developed assets such as fast attack boats, sea mines, and shore-to-ship missile systems to shift the power dynamics in the region. Rather than merely blocking the strait, Iran has managed to maintain control over it, ensuring that only ships linked to its enemies are barred from passage.

That sustained disruption, however, has prompted Donald Trump to diminish almost all his effort to “reopen” it by publishing an expletive-laden post on social media in which he threatened to destroy Iran’s power plants and bridges if it failed to meet his Tuesday deadline to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to all shipping.

The US president repeated an earlier threat to unleash “hell” but told US media there was a “good chance” of a deal being reached with Tehran.

7. Influence in determining the new Leader

The assassination of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei at the outset of the war was widely seen in Washington and Tel Aviv as a decisive turning point, one that could weaken Iran from within and potentially open the door for external influence over its political future. 

Donald Trump soon appeared to believe that the removal of Iran’s top authority would disrupt the political system, create internal divisions, and allow room to shape the succession process.
This expectation, however, proved to be a major miscalculation. Instead of producing a power vacuum, Iran activated a rapid and structured transition mechanism. Under its constitutional framework, an interim leadership arrangement was swiftly established, followed by the selection of a new supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts. Within days, Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed as successor, signaling continuity rather than rupture.

Reports and analyses suggest that US policymakers had also entertained broader ambitions of influencing the outcome of Iran’s leadership transition, drawing comparisons to other geopolitical cases such as Venezuela. Public remarks attributed to Trump indicated a desire to play a direct role in shaping Iran’s new political order, including opposition to certain candidates. His criticism of Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment, and his insistence on a leader aligned with U.S. preferences, underscored these intentions.

Analysts note that the swift appointment was not only a procedural step but also a political signal, demonstrating that the system remained intact and capable of reproducing leadership even under extreme external pressure.

Far from fragmenting, Iran’s political structure showed resilience. The transition reinforced the perception of institutional continuity, with the new leader widely viewed as aligned with the policies and orientation of his predecessor. 

Trump’s public reactions, expressing dissatisfaction and questioning the durability of the new leadership, reflected frustration rather than influence. His remarks implicitly acknowledged that the anticipated “decapitation” of Iran’s leadership had not occurred in any strategic sense.

8. An attack on Iran will have controlled impact on the global economy

This claim rests on a simplistic assumption: that global markets can absorb a major geopolitical shock in the Middle East without significant disruption. In reality, evidence suggests otherwise. Iran lies adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical passage through which a substantial share of the world’s oil trade flows. Even the mere threat of instability in this corridor without a full-scale war has historically triggered immediate volatility in energy prices.

Rising oil prices are not just a standalone indicator; they mark the beginning of a broader chain reaction. Higher energy costs quickly spill over into transportation, manufacturing, and ultimately consumer prices. In a global economy still heavily dependent on fossil fuels, such shocks can fuel inflation and slow economic growth. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund have repeatedly warned that tensions in the Middle East represent one of the most significant systemic risks to the global economy. Moreover, oil is not the only commodity affected. Fertilizers, helium, and other goods that pass through the Strait of Hormuz are also exposed to disruption, and shortages in these materials can drive up prices in food, digital products, and other industries reliant on them.

In addition, financial markets are highly sensitive to geopolitical risk. In a conflict scenario, capital flight from riskier markets, increased demand for safe-haven assets, and sharp stock market volatility are all likely. Rising maritime insurance costs and disruptions to supply chains could further slow global trade.

In sum, the assumption that an attack on Iran would have little or controllable economic impact is inconsistent with both empirical evidence and the interconnected nature of the global economy. Such a miscalculation risks severely underestimating the true costs of a crisis.

9. Iran is like Venezuela!

Comparing Iran to Venezuela is a form of analytical oversimplification that ignores fundamental differences between the two. First and foremost is Iran’s geopolitical position in the Middle East, a region that serves as the center of global energy and a focal point of great power competition. Venezuela, despite its oil wealth, does not occupy a similarly strategic position in the global system.

Another key factor is popular resistance. Historical experiences such as the Iran–Iraq War demonstrate that, under external threat, a form of social cohesion and mass mobilization can emerge in Iran. This type of resistance despite internal divisions can significantly increase the military and political costs of foreign intervention and prevent the realization of quick, decisive scenarios.

Large-scale public mobilization and widespread willingness to defend the country are often cited as reinforcing this dynamic.

Alongside this is military capability, particularly in the form of asymmetric deterrence. In recent years, Iran has developed capacities in missiles, drones, and unconventional warfare that enhance its ability to impose costs on adversaries, especially in sensitive areas like the Strait of Hormuz. Venezuela does not possess this level of military depth or complexity.

Furthermore, Iran maintains a network of aligned actors across the region that could expand the scope of any conflict beyond its borders. Analyses by institutions such as the RAND Corporation suggest that such a scenario would likely evolve into a prolonged and costly conflict rather than a limited operation.

Ultimately, this comparison is not only inaccurate but potentially misleading, as it can lead to flawed assessments of the scale, complexity, and cost of any military action against Iran.

10. The United States can end a war whenever it decides

This claim is rooted in a traditional view of military power: that superiority alone is sufficient to control both the timing and outcome of war. Contemporary experience challenges this assumption. In conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, despite overwhelming military dominance, was unable to impose a swift and desired end to hostilities. These cases demonstrate that wars are shaped by far more complex variables than mere political will.

In the case of Iran, these complexities are amplified. The country’s ability to employ asymmetric tools from disrupting energy routes to activating regional actors can extend both the scope and duration of conflict. At the same time, internal resistance can raise human and political costs, complicating efforts to secure rapid and lasting outcomes.

Moreover, wars are not decided solely on the battlefield. Domestic pressures including public opinion and economic burden play a critical role in determining when and how conflicts end. In an interconnected global economy, rising energy costs and market instability can directly influence political decision-making.

Finally, the end of active combat does not necessarily mark the end of a crisis. Instability, proxy conflicts, and economic repercussions can persist for years. The notion that a military power can simply decide when a war ends and bring it to a clean, controlled conclusion is less a practical reality than a theoretical simplification that overlooks the inherent complexity of modern warfare.